



# Low Carbon Ukraine

Policy advice on low-carbon policies for Ukraine

Policy Briefing #6

Supported by:



Federal Ministry  
for the Environment, Nature Conservation  
and Nuclear Safety

based on a decision of the German Bundestag

## A Scenario-based 2035 Forecast of Electricity Demand in Ukraine

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Berlin, March 2019

Implemented by

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Economics

## Key Messages

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- 1 A proper demand forecast is key to an efficiently designed future power plant park
- 2 Growth of total electricity demand in Ukraine is restrained by rising electricity prices and efficiency gains
- 3 Electricity demand is projected to increase substantially only in a scenario of strong economic growth
- 4 Under all scenarios of electricity demand growth, Ukraine will face overcapacities of thermal power plants by 2035

## Why forecasting electricity demand is important

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- Forecasting demand is crucial for the development of a country's electricity system
- **Underestimating** demand poses the risk of underdeveloping the power plant park, thus increasing the risk of not being able to cover peak loads
- **Overestimating** demand can result in expensive overcapacities and low utilisation/full load hours

*How to set up the power plant park so that security of supply is guaranteed in every hour of the year?*

- Make sure that **peak load** can be covered by flexible capacities
- With nuclear covering the base load in Ukraine, flexibility is provided almost entirely by thermal plants today

## Even at peak demand, thermal plants are used far below capacity

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- In 2018, Ukraine's total electricity consumption peaked on December 20 at 5PM with **23.7 GW** (2017: 23.2 GW)
- At the same time, thermal plants were close to their 2018 maximum hourly output of **10 GW** while having a total capacity of **25 GW** – a capacity factor at peak demand of only 42%
- The 2018 average capacity factor for thermal plants was even lower at only 25% – which is **ineffective** and **expensive**
- Moreover, less flexible capacity might be needed in the future: Measures such as **demand-side management** or increased **import** can reduce peak loads further

→ Against this background, the **development of demand** determines how much of Ukraine's thermal capacities will be really needed in the next 15 years

## A model to forecast aggregated demand




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- We adopt an intuitive, scenario-based method introduced by Hirschhausen & Andres (1999) to forecast aggregate electricity demand/consumption:

$$E_{2035} = \left[ \left( \frac{GDP_{2035}}{GDP_{2018}} \right)^{\alpha} * \left( \frac{P_{2035}}{P_{2018}} \right)^{\beta} * (1 - \gamma)^{2035-2018} \right] * E_{2018}$$

- **Electricity consumption** is stimulated by **GDP** growth but restrained by growing **electricity prices** and increased **energy efficiency**
- **$\alpha$**  and  **$\beta$**  determine the income and price elasticities of electricity consumption: To what extent is electricity demand affected by changes in GDP and electricity prices?

## Executive summary of 2035 forecast results

Low growth scenario	Intermediate growth scenario	High growth scenario
Real GDP rises by 18%	Real GDP rises by 79%	Real GDP rises by 169%
Electricity prices rise by 9%	Electricity prices rise by 40%	Electricity prices rise by 79%
Energy efficiency increases by 18%	Energy efficiency increases by 18%	Energy efficiency increases by 18%
		
Electricity consumption <i>decreases</i> by <b>10%</b>	Electricity consumption <i>increases</i> by <b>6%</b>	Electricity consumption <i>increases</i> by <b>26%</b>

- How did we achieve these results?  
→ For the macro model we employed, the selection of reasonable parameters and scenarios is key

## GDP growth has a positive but small impact on power demand

Year	Electricity demand growth/Real GDP growth
1992	0.7
1993	0.6
1994	0.5
1995	0.4
1996	1.0
1997	1.3
1998	2.7
1999	12.9
2000	-0.3
2001	-0.1
2002	0.2
2003	0.5
2004	0.4
2005	0.7
2006	0.5
2007	0.4
2008	-0.2
2009	0.6
2010	32.3
2011	0.5
2012	-4.2
2013	.
2014	0.8
2015	0.7
2016	-0.2
2017	0.2
2018	0.7

- Income elasticity shows how electricity consumption reacts to real GDP growth
- Historically, Ukraine shows a low influence of real GDP growth on electricity demand
- Median of all **income elasticities** since 1992: **0.5**

→ „If real GDP grows by 1%, electricity demand grows by 0.5%“

- As elasticities should always be treated with caution, we run sensitivity analyses with lower and higher values for  $\alpha$


## Rising prices negatively affect electricity consumption

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- Price elasticity shows how electricity demand reacts to increases in real electricity prices
  - Usually, this relation is **negative**: If electricity gets more expensive, people change consumption habits and consume relatively less
  - Alberini et al. (2017) find short-run price elasticities for Ukrainian residential consumers of -0.2 to -0.5, with the bulk of estimates around **-0.3**
  - Kozlova (2012) finds overall short-run price elasticities of around **-0.2** for Ukraine
  - We opt for a price elasticity of **-0.2**, but run sensitivity analyses with lower and higher values for  $\beta$
- „If real electricity prices grow by 1%, electricity demand falls by 0.2%“




## Energy efficiency – Still a lot of room for improvement



- Ukraine has a much higher ratio of electricity consumption to GDP than a number of selected countries

## Energy efficiency – How other countries have developed


Electricity intensity trajectories starting when they hit Ukraine's current value  
(kWh consumption/GDP, PPP, current international \$)



Source: World Bank Data

- Countries that once had a similar electricity intensity as Ukraine today (~0.38) have shown an average annual improvement of **4.7%**

## Energy efficiency – A potential future path



Source: World Bank Data, own calculations

- With an annual improvement of 4.7%, Ukraine would be as electricity intensive by 2035 as most East European countries are today
- These improvements include price effects, structural economic shifts and technological efficiency gains, among others
- As price effects are covered separately, we choose a low value for the exogenous efficiency increase of **1%** per year for all scenarios

## Scenarios for annual GDP and electricity price growth

Scenario	Real GDP	Real electricity prices
Low growth	1%	0.5%
Intermediate growth	3.5%	2%
High growth	6%	3.5%

- Prices linked to GDP growth: The higher economic growth, the easier to implement price increases and vice versa
- Intermediate/ reference scenario for **GDP** based on IMF forecast until 2023 (see Backup)
- **Electricity prices** need to increase in order to reach cost-recovering levels – the higher economic growth, the more prices move towards European levels


## Detailed results and parameters of the aggregate model

Categories	Unit	Low growth scenario 2035	Intermediate growth scenario 2035	High growth scenario 2035
Total electricity consumption (2018=100)	Total % change	<b>-10%</b>	<b>+6%</b>	<b>+23%</b>
	TWh	134	157	183
GDP (2018=100)	Total % change	<b>+18%</b>	<b>+79%</b>	<b>+169%</b>
	% growth p.a.	1.0%	3.5%	6.0%
Real electricity prices (2018=100)	Total % change	<b>+9%</b>	<b>+40%</b>	<b>+79%</b>
	% growth p.a.	0.5%	2.0%	3.5%
Energy efficiency increase	% growth p.a.	1%	1%	1%
Income elasticity		0.5	0.5	0.5
Price elasticity		-0.2	-0.2	-0.2

Source: Own calculations

## Demand is unlikely to exceed 2011 levels in the next 10 years

- With real GDP growth of **3.5% p.a.** and electricity prices up **40% in total**, Ukraine's electricity consumption would only grow marginally until 2035
- Total electricity demand is projected to increase significantly only in the high growth scenario
- Results depend on assumption of prices rising slower than GDP: If price growth overtakes GDP growth, resulting electricity demand growth is significantly smaller or even negative



Source: Own calculations

## Conclusion and outlook

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- Only under a scenario of **high GDP and price growth**, total electricity demand would be significantly higher in 2035 (up ~23% in total)
- Even in this case, peak loads would not exceed 30 GW – in the intermediate scenario, peak loads of not more than **25 GW** are realistic
- Assuming that nuclear plants will continue to cover the base load, not more than **12 GW** of flexible plants will be necessary to cover peak loads – less than half of today's installed capacity
- This number could be further reduced if old coal plants are replaced with more flexible, gas-fired plants


# Backup





## Backup – TPPs are constantly operating far below capacity

2018 hourly loads and generation ordered according to descending consumption, MW



Source: Ukrenergo

## Backup – IMF forecast for real GDP growth in Ukraine

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Year	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Real GDP growth (Annual percent change)	2.7	3	3.2	3.3	3.4




Source: IMF

## Backup – Sensitivity Analysis I: Elasticities

Price elasticity	Income elasticity		
	0.3	0.5	0.7
-0.1	92	104	117
-0.2	88	100	113
-0.4	82	93	105

- Within the intermediate scenario, different **income** and **price elasticities** have a large effect on final electricity demand in 2035

## Backup – Sensitivity Analysis II: Energy efficiency improvement

Low growth scenario	Intermediate growth scenario	High growth scenario
Real GDP rises by 18%	Real GDP rises by 79%	Real GDP rises by 169%
Electricity prices rise by 9%	Electricity prices rise by 40%	Electricity prices rise by 79%
Energy efficiency increases by 40%	Energy efficiency increases by 40%	Energy efficiency increases by 40%
		
Electricity consumption <i>decreases</i> by 24%	Electricity consumption <i>decreases</i> by 11%	Electricity consumption <i>increases</i> by 4%

- With an annual improvement in energy efficiency of 2% instead of 1%, electricity consumption only increases marginally in the high growth scenario