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Effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on climate and energy policies in the European Union's Eastern Partnership and Central Asian countries

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■ Economics

Berlin, June 2022



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1. Introduction

- **Before invasion**, energy and climate policy was affected by long-term emission targets (e.g. NDCs) and impacts of Covid-19 pandemic
- Russian invasion of Ukraine resulted in massive geopolitical and economic consequences beyond Ukraine:
 - Separation of markets
 - Interrupted trade relations
 - Disruption of traditional energy supply channels
- Historical and geographical proximity of the region of the European Union's Eastern Partnership and Central Asia influences climate and energy policy



2. Impact channels for climate policy


The impact of the war in Ukraine on:



| Key criteria | |
|--|--|
| Energy mix profile (total primary energy supply) | Existing climate policy (e.g. NDC) |
| Trade profile | Political decisions and macroeconomic impact |



2.1 Energy prices



Decoupling from Russia affected energy prices:

- Brent crude oil increased while Urals slightly decreased (price discount of 34 USD/bbl)
- High increase and volatility of natural gas prices
- Coal prices show highest spike


1. Generally, importers and exporters of fossil fuels are disincentivised to use fossil fuels



Importers of cheap Russian fossil fuel supply turn away from Russia due to political & energy security considerations
 New energy security paradigm



2.2 Metal prices



Source: Investing.com

- Ukraine and Russia are major producers of metals
 - Russian steel: partially sanctioned by the EU
 - Ukrainian steel: partially destroyed steel mills
- Steel-producing countries might increase steel production
 - Conventional steel production is a major emitter of CO₂



2.3 Macroeconomic situation



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook November 2021 (old forecast) and April 2022 (new forecast)

- Growth forecast for emerging and developing countries significantly affected
 - Only AZE has positive improved growth projections due to domestic fossil fuel production
- Reduced GDP growth affects climate policy:
 - Rising public budget deficits restrict the countries ability to spend on climate-related policies
 - Less economic activity reduces GHG emissions in short-run



2.4 International policy developments related to climate change

Before invasion


- Climate commitments under Paris Agreement (NDCs)
- EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)

Following invasion

- Energy independence (decoupling from Russia) in OECD countries is closely connected to decarbonisation
- Especially, countries with EU perspective (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia) might follow the path (high carbon price, strict regulation, etc.)



3. Comparison of countries and regional trends




Russian fossil fuel imports as share of total energy 80% supply (TES) 60% 40% 20% 0% **ARM AZE GEO** KAZ KGZ MDA TJK UZB ■ Natural gas ■ Oil products ■ Crude oil ■ Coal

Source: IEA, UN Comtrade


- High use of natural gas and oil products but only AZE, KAZ and UZB are net exporters of fossil fuels
- TJK and KGZ rely on mix of hydropower and coal
- GEO (& ARM) also significant share of hydropower
- All countries are in **geographical proximity** to Russia and share common
 Soviet **history**
 - High dependence on fossil fuel imports from Russia (except UZB and AZE)
 - KAZ is dependent on fossil fuel routes via Russia



3. Comparison of countries and regional trends



Source: UN Comtrade



Source: UN Comtrade

- All countries rely on the **fossil fuel and/or metal/mining sectors** (besides right-bank MDA)
 - In ARM, KGZ, TJK and UZB, metals and mining accounts for 44-66% of total trade
- Some countries produce critical minerals which are crucial for the energy transition
 - Central Asia uranium, antimony, copper
- Major expansions of the extractive sectors (under current conditions) could exacerbate historical ills and climate targets/policies
- Climate targets differ significantly between countries
 - Most countries allow themselves to increase GHG emissions until 2030



4.1 Conclusion

- Globally, countries will face strong incentives to lower domestic consumption
 of fossil fuels due to high and unpredictable prices and supply issues, such as
 increased demand for non-Russian fossil fuels
- Exporters of energy and/or metals will be incentivised to increase exports but may be constrained by capacity or logistical difficulties
- Countries with closer ties to Russia may have access to discounted energy imports, weakening incentives to conserve energy or invest in renewables
- However, this is counteracted by a new energy security paradigm emerging in the region. Domestic renewable energy sources provide an attractive alternative to increasingly price-volatile fossil fuel imports
- A weaker global and regional macroeconomic situation will lead to a more challenging context for ambitious domestic climate policy in the region
- Conversely, reduced growth may lead to lower emissions in the short run



4.2 Policy recommendations

- Continue to pursue and sharpen strategies towards decarbonisation
- Replace energy price subsidies or consumer tariffs regulated far below market value with more effective social policy instruments such as targeted social transfers or minimum income schemes
- International community should support these countries in their efforts to decarbonise
- International partners should support necessary reforms and decarbonisation policies by technical assistance and capacity-building measures





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